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20 years on: Manfred Womer's impact as NATO Secretary General
The job of serving as NATO's Secretary
General has never been easy. But perhaps it
has never been more complicated than
today. With 28 allies. a host or partner states,
and a stralegic agenda that lndudes
counter-terrorism, cyber-security, missile
defence, among a range or other security
challenges, leading the Alliance today is a
formidable task.
Indeed, the current Secretary General,
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, has embraced
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this environment. In the process, he has
introduced new ways or governing this
military and political organisation.
Rasmussen has brought about novel Ideas, strategies and diplomatic methods to deal with
the complexities of leading NATO during his years at the helm.
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Yet Rasmussen's leadership must be placed in the context or the Immediate years after the
Cold War, and especially of one of his predecessors: Manfred WOrner. He was the first and
only German to have served as NATO Secretary General, from 1988 unUI his death In 1994.
This summer markS the 20th anniversary of his passing.
Womer remains the only Secretary General to have died in omce, which no doubt adds to his
legacy. Yet it was his manner of leadership, both in substance and In style, Which so
profoundly shaped his legacy and NATO's transformation into a modem alliance.
During much of the Cold War period, lhe office of NATO's Secretary General was occupied by
talented diplomats, who often did exceptional work in fostering consensus. Yet In these
years, the Alliance's mandate was far more conservative, which often led to oonservatlve
leaders who sought not to rock the boa~ but rather to remain on the same course.
Worner saw the office differently- as a rorum for advancing policy change. While recognising
that his main job was to produce oonsensus among the Allies, at the same time he was
anything but a simple ·secretary." there to mend diplomatic differences and keep the peace.
Worner was a secretary general who would challenge, cajole, and at times berate an ally to
adapt to new strategic conditions. Indeed, given how he envisioned his leadership role,
Womer was at the forefront of many difficult issues facing the Alliance during his tenure.

Womer helped guide lhe process of shaping lhe 1991
Rome Summit decision, which Introduced revolutionary
ideas in lhe Alliance's mission to lndude peacekeeping,
oonftict prevention and crisis diplomacy.
Womer also expressly reached out to lhe Soviet Union
and later Russia, all In an effort to cultivate an improved
diplomatic relationship.
On his own timetable, he also came to accept and then
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lobby for membership expansion to Central and Eastern
Europe. Perhaps most notable was his intense desire to
see war end In the Balkans. This culminated in his memorable visit to the North Atlantic
Council (NAC) In Aprll 1994, while he was dying from cancer. With his Illness eating his body
away and his physician at his side, Worner went to the NAC to plead for the Allies to
demonstrate military resolve to prevent more suffering . In the end, WOmer got what he
desired , as NATO agreed to face the crisis.

Across all major Issues In NATO's transformation, Worner was at the oentre of change. But
beyond his policy contributions. Worner had a number of personal skills that served him well.
Worner was a student of foreign languages and made efforts to utilise these skills to achieve
consensus. He also garnered wide respect for his ability to think strategically. In this regard ,
he could think broadly about tuture policy directions that he felt the Allies should consider.

Womer also brought passion to Ille office. In his capacity as "general." Weimer was not afraid
to place direct pressure on Ille Allies to reform, take action, and to use force as necessary. As
lhen Assistant Secretary General of NATO Robin Beard noted. WOmerwas "a statesman Who
could express anger.• His presence was no doubt aided by his 'booming· voice, Which was
impossible to ignore.
Worner demonstrated that NATO's Secretary General is
there to lead-specially during moments of crisis-as
many of his successors have slmlla~y done. Such
leadership from this omoe can be the key ingredient for
diplomatic progress and Alllenoe transformation.
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